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Differentially Private State Estimation
in Distribution Networks with Smart Meters
Henrik Sandberg, Gyo¨rgy Da´n, and Ragnar Thobaben
Abstract— State estimation is routinely being performed in
high-voltage power transmission grids in order to assist in
operation and to detect faulty equipment. In low- and medium-
voltage power distribution grids, on the other hand, few real-
time measurements are traditionally available, and operation is
often conducted based on predicted and historical data. Today,
in many parts of the world, smart meters have been deployed at
many customers, and their measurements could in principle be
shared with the operators in real time to enable improved state
estimation. However, customers may feel reluctance in doing so
due to privacy concerns. We therefore propose state estimation
schemes for a distribution grid model, which ensure differential
privacy to the customers. In particular, the state estimation
schemes optimize different performance criteria, and a trade-off
between a lower bound on the estimation performance versus
the customers’ differential privacy is derived. The proposed
framework is general enough to be applicable also to other
distribution networks, such as water and gas networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation has long been an essential component of
electric power system monitoring and control systems [1]. In
transmission systems it is typically based on near-real time
measurements of voltages, power flows, and more recently,
voltage phasors. In low- and medium-voltage distribution
systems it is, however, often based on predicted loads
in lack of a dedicated communication infrastructure and
measurement devices [2], [3]. Due to the proliferation of
volatile distributed renewable generation (e.g., residential PV
systems), predicted loads will soon no longer be sufficient
to achieve a good enough state estimate that would allow
efficient and safe operation of the distribution grid, e.g., volt-
age conservation and VAR control (VVC), or fault location,
isolation and restoration (FLIR), and real-time measurements
will therefore become necessary.
While a dedicated real-time monitoring infrastructure for
distribution grids may be too expensive, automated and smart
meters, which are being deployed world-wide for billing
purposes, could be used for providing the operators frequent
measurements of the loads, thereby enabling dynamic state
estimation. Nonetheless, collecting frequent measurement
data about residential or industrial customers’ loads can be
used to invade the customers’ privacy in a variety of ways [4].
To protect customers’ privacy but at the same time allow
frequent smart meter measurements for system operation,
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a number of privacy-preserving aggregation schemes have
been proposed recently [5], [6], [7]. Aggregation can be
done via a trusted third party [5] or by using cryptographic
solutions such as homomorphic encryption [6], but these
solutions increase system complexity significantly. An al-
ternative aggregation scheme that does not increase system
complexity relies on adding random noise, typically Gaussian
or Laplacian, to the measurement data submitted by the cus-
tomers. Combined with careful protocol design, aggregation
with random noise has been shown to provide differential
privacy [7], a probabilistic notion of privacy that is widely
used in statistical databases [8], [9] and has recently found
application in filtering and control [10], [11]. While adding
noise may help preserve privacy, a fundamental question
is how it would affect the quality of state estimation, and
ultimately the power system applications that rely on it.
In this paper, we address this question by providing a
characterization of the trade-off between differential privacy
and the mean distortion of the state estimate in a single
feeder of a distribution network based on load measurements
from smart meters. We characterize the ǫ- and the (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy under Laplacian and Gaussian additive
random noise, respectively. We express the maximum a pos-
teriori state estimate as the solution of a convex programming
problem, and provide a closed-form expression for the linear
minimum mean square error estimate. We show that a
customer by adding random noise may only have to give
up a little bit extra of privacy, and can still dramatically
improve the state estimation performance, which could en-
able optimizing financial incentives for trading estimation
performance and customer privacy.
The trade-off between privacy and estimation quality has
been considered for inter-area state estimation in [12], where
the trade-off between the mutual information and the ex-
pected distortion was investigated in an information-theoretic
framework. The authors in [13] studied the trade-off between
the distortion of the estimate of a random variable modeling
an electric load and the information leakage quantified by
the mutual information. Instead of mutual information, in this
paper we use differential privacy, which allows us to evaluate
privacy when different users’ data are non-stationary, and
even without a statistical model of the data. In [10], the
authors study the differential privacy of the inputs to a
dynamical system when releasing the outputs to a potential
adversary, and design a differentially private Kalman filter
that protects the input variables. In this paper, the setup is
somewhat similar but we do not consider a dynamical system
and we do analyze the case when the filter has access to side
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Fig. 1. The considered distribution line. The grid operator can only directly
measure the current I0 at the substation. We analyze how the operator
can benefit in the state estimation from communicated measurements of
the loads L1, L2, . . . , LN , while maintaining individual customers’ privacy
(customer denoted by C).
information, beyond the control of the inputs. In [11], the
authors evaluate the cost of differential privacy in a system of
agents that try to estimate their environment in a distributed
manner. In our work, the estimation is done by a central
entity instead of the agents themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes our model and the problem formulation. Section III
defines differential privacy in the context of state estimation.
Section IV provides optimal state estimation algorithms
under various assumptions and bounds on their accuracy.
Section V analyzes the trade-off between privacy and es-
timation error, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MODELING AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Operators of low- and medium-voltage power distribution
networks today typically only have access to a relatively
small number of real-time measurements [2], [3]. It is then
not possible to run standard state estimation algorithms as
is commonly used in high-voltage transmission grids [1]. In
this work, we therefore analyze how low-level measurements
of the customers’ loads can be integrated in state estimation
schemes, while ensuring the customers’ privacy.
We consider a single distribution line that is connected to a
substation under the control of an operator, see Fig. 1. Since
distribution grids are typically radial, this is not a severe
restriction. There are N service drops or laterals along the
line; at each service drop location j along the line, there
are several loads connected in parallel, which draw a total
load current Lj . We will here investigate the “value” of a
measurement of Lj t the operator. Such a measurement
could be realized in a modern distribution p wer grid by
using individual customers’ smart meters. For example, the
individual customers at location j could aggregate their
measurements and send them directly to the operator, in
real time. However, for privacy reasons, it may not be
desirable for an individual customer to share its instantaneous
load. We denote such a customer by C in Fig. 1, and
will next investigate how the customer can contribute with
measurements and still maintain a quantifiable amount of
privacy.
Remark 1: It is not necessary to have a trusted agent at
location j to perform the aggregation of the measured load
currents, to form the measurement of Lj . In [7], it is shown
how such computations can be securely decentralized among
the customers.
1) Modeling: In what we call the Base Scenario, the
operator has only access to a real-time measurement Z0
of the total urrent flow I0 that is being supplied from the
substation,
Z0 = I0 +W0, (1)
where W0 ∼ N (0, R0) is zero-mean Gaussian measurement
noise, of variance R0 ≡ σ20 (σ0 is the standard deviation). In
the Base Scenario, we also assume the operator has access
to a statistical model of the loads L1, L2, . . . , LN along the
line. In the power systems literature, sometimes such data
are referred to as pseudo measurements. The load vector L
is assumed to have a multivariate Gaussian distribution, L ∼
N (m,P ), with mean and covariance denoted by
m =


m1
.
.
.
mN

 := E[L] =


E[L1]
.
.
.
E[LN ]


P =


P11 . . . P1N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
PN1 . . . PNN

 := E[(L−m)(L −m)T ].
The Gaussian distribution of the loads can be justified if
we assume each load Lj is an aggregate of a multitude
of individual customers as indicated already in Fig. 1.
The operator could estimate this statistical model based on
historical load data. The following notation will also be used,

P1
.
.
.
PN

 :=


P11 + . . .+ P1N
.
.
.
PN1 + . . .+ PNN

 = P1,
where 1 is column vector of ones.
In this paper, the sole physical model used is based on the
conservation of currents, i.e.,
Ij =
∑
k>j
Lk, j = 0, 1, . . . , N, (2)
where Ij are the (unknown) currents along the line. It is clear
that the operator may benefit from a more detailed physical
model in the sta e estimation to follow, but we leave this
option for future work.
Remark 2: No e that flow co servation models imilar to
(2) apply to other distribution networks, such as gas and
water networks, where mass is a conserved quant y. Hence,
the results that follow are applicable also in these scenarios.
Based on the model (2), it follows that the total current I0
has a Gaussian distribution, I0 ∼ N (m0, P0 +R0), where
m0 := m1 +m2 + . . .+mN , P0 := 1
TP1.
In what we call the Smart Meter Scenario, the operator
is also provided real-time measurements Zj of the loads
L1, L2, . . . , LN ,
Zj = Lj +Wj , j = 1, 2, . . . , N, (3)
where Wj ∼ Lap(bj) are independent zero-mean random
noise variables with Laplacian distributions of variance Rj =
2b2j . (The probability density function (PDF) of a zero-mean
Laplacian random variable W is pW (w) = 12be
−|w|/b
.) The
reason for the Laplacian noise assumption will become clear
in Section III.
2) Problem Formulation: Based on the measurement Z0
and the statistical model of L, it is possible for the operator
in the Base Scenario to estimate the loads L1, L2, . . . , LN
and currents I1, I2, . . . , IN−1 along the line, see Section IV.
With such estimates, one can monitor the status of the
line and detect faults in real time. However, when the load
uncertainty is large (the covariance P is large), the quality
of this estimate is low.
The main problem considered in this paper is how to
integrate the load measurements Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN in the state
estimation in the Smart Meter Scenario, and to quantify the
improvement of the estimate and the loss of privacy that the
customers experience.
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION
LINE LOADS
In this section, the goal is to quantify the loss of pri-
vacy that the customers along the distribution line expe-
rience through the introduction of the load measurements
Z0, Z1, . . . , ZN .
A. Differential Privacy
To quantify the level of privacy enjoyed by the customers
along the line, we employ the notion of differential privacy,
see [8], [9], [10], [11], for example. We first need to introduce
some concepts: Suppose that data from m customers are
stored in a vector d ∈ Rm. We call the vector d a data
vector. We say two data vectors d, d′ ∈ Rm are adjacent,
Adj(d, d′), if and only if they differ in one entry:
for some k, dk 6= d′k, and dl = d′l for all l 6= k.
A concrete example is that one customer turns off his
smart meter and does not participate in the data collection,
transforming d into d′. We also note that Adj(·, ·) is a
symmetric binary relation.
We say a measurement M(·,W ) : Rm → R, where W
is a random variable, is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all
adjacent data vectors d, d′ ∈ Rm, and possible events E ⊆
Supp(M(d,W )) ∪ Supp(M(d′,W )), it holds
Pr[M(d,W ) ∈ E] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(d′,W ) ∈ E] + δ. (4)
If ǫ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 are small, this means that the changes
in the statistics of the output of M are very small when
applied to any adjacent data vectors. Put differently, with
access to only the output of M , it is practically impossible
to decide whether a single customer has participated in
the measurement, or not, and (ǫ, δ) provides a quantitative
certificate of privacy to the customer. If (4) holds with δ = 0,
we say M is ǫ-differentially private. More details on the
interpretation of differential privacy can be found in [8], [9],
[10], [11], for example.
To design (ǫ, δ)-differentially private measurements M ,
we use Theorems 2 and 3 in [10]. First, we suppose the
measurements can be written in the general form
M(d,W ) = q(d) +W,
where q : Rm → R is a deterministic query that depends on
the data vector only. Next, define the sensitivity of a query
q by
S(q) := sup
d,d′:Adj(d,d′)
|q(d)− q(d′)|.
That is, S(q) measures the worst-case change in output of
q(d) over adjacent data vectors d. The following proposition
then holds.
Proposition 1 ([10]): The measurement M(d,W ) =
q(d) +W is:
(a) ǫ-differentially private if the random variable W has a
Laplace distribution, W ∼ Lap(b), with zero mean and
scale parameter b ≥ S(q)ǫ ;
(b) (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if the random variable W
has a Gaussian distribution, W ∼ N (0, σ2), with
zero mean and standard deviation σ ≥ S(q)2ǫ (K +√
K2 + 2ǫ), where K := K(δ) = Q−1(δ) and Q(x) :=
1√
2π
∫∞
x e
−u2/2du.
Hence, by either adding Laplacian noise or Gaussian noise
to a query we obtain differential privacy. Note that Laplacian
noise yields better privacy (δ = 0) because its PDF has fatter
tails. Thus if customers can choose to add noise, Laplacian
noise is the natural selection and justifies the model (3).
The noise in (1) is modeled as being Gaussian, because
we assume it arises in the physical meter owned by the
operator. There is of course also similar physical noise in the
customers’ smart meters, but for simplicity we assume this
is negligible. In any case, introducing more noise sources
in the customers’ measurements would only increase their
privacy.
B. Privacy in the Base Scenario
By providing measurements of the loads Lj , it is clear
that the customers will loose some privacy. However, the
operator can already measure the total current I0 by means
of (1), beyond the control of the customers. We should
first therefore evaluate the loss of privacy through this
measurement. Because Z0 is subjected to Gaussian noise,
we use Proposition 1-(b).
The query in this case is the total current, q0 = l1 +
l2 + . . . + lN , where l1, l2, . . . , lN are realizations of the
random variables L1, L2, . . . , LN . An adjacent load pattern
is obtained if a single customer C at an arbitrary location j
changes his or her load, so that the load goes from lj to l′j . If
we assume a (uniform) bound on the difference between the
maximum and minimum load current of a single customer
is ∆, it easily follows that the sensitivity of q0 is
S(q0) = ∆.
The differential privacy in the Base Scenario is stated next.
Lemma 1: The measurement Z0 gives (ǫ0, δ0)-differential
privacy to the customers, where
ǫ0 =
∆K
σ0
+O
( ǫ0
K
)
, ǫ0 → 0,
and K = K(δ0) = Q−1(δ0).
Proof: Follows by a Taylor expansion of the standard
deviation formula in Proposition 1-(b).
A typical choice of δ0 is 0.05, which gives K ≈ 1.64, or
δ0 = 0.01, which gives K ≈ 2.33. We note that the O(·)-
term in Lemma 1 can be neglected if the customer size ∆
is small as compared to K , and then ǫ0 ≈ ∆K/σ0.
Remark 3: Note that differential privacy is independent of
the underlying probability distribution of the load pattern L
(the data). Hence, no matter if it is really Gaussian, or not,
the level of privacy is guaranteed. The statistical model of
the data is needed for reliable state estimation, however.
C. Privacy in the Smart Meter Scenario
In the Smart Meter Scenario, the customers provide the
measurements Zj , j = 1, 2, . . . , N to the operator, which
causes a loss of privacy compared to the Base Scenario. In
this case, the queries are of the type qj = lj , where lj is
a realization of Lj . Under the same assumptions as in the
previous subsection, we have that
S(qj) = ∆, j = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where ∆ is the uniform bound on a single customer’s
maximum load current change.
Remark 4: Note that the measurement Zj sent to the
operator is the sum (aggregate) of all the customers’ load
currents at location j, plus the chosen Laplacian noise.
We assume that ∆ is a bound that works for every single
customer at location j.
By Proposition 1-(a), it is clear that the measurement Zj
gives ǫ-differential privacy to every single customer, where
ǫ = ∆/bj . Hence, by choosing the scaling parameter bj for
the Laplacian noise properly, the customers can tune the level
of privacy. However, there is also a loss of privacy through
Z0, and for the composite measurement (Z0, Zj) we have
the following result.
Theorem 1: The composite measurement (Z0, Zj) gives
a customer at location j a (ǫ0 + ǫ, δ0eǫ)-differential pri-
vacy, when Z0 is (ǫ0, δ0)-differentially private and Zj is ǫ-
differentially private.
Proof: By definition of differential privacy, we have
that
Pr[Z0 ∈ E0|Lj = lj] ≤ eǫ0 Pr[Z0 ∈ E0|Lj = l′j ] + δ0
Pr[Zj ∈ Ej |Lj = lj] ≤ eǫ Pr[Zj ∈ Ej |Lj = l′j ],
for all events E0 and Ej and adjacent loads |lj − l′j | ≤
∆. Multiplying the two inequalities, and using that the
measurements are independent, we obtain
Pr[Z0 ∈ E0, Zj ∈ Ej |Lj = lj ]
≤ eǫ0+ǫ Pr[Z0 ∈ E0, Zj ∈ Ej |Lj = l′j ] + δ0eǫ,
which yields the result.
That there is not a dramatic loss of privacy under compo-
sitions of differentially private measurements is in fact one
of the main advantages of differential privacy, see [9] for a
more general treatment.
IV. STATE ESTIMATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION LINE
In this section, we present algorithms for computing
(optimal) state estimates, and we bound their accuracies. To
simplify the presentation, we here only consider the estimates
of an arbitrary load Lj , and not currents Ij . Because of the
linear relation (2), it should be clear how to obtain estimates
of the currents from the load estimates.
A. Optimal State Estimation in the Base Scenario
In the Base Scenario, the operator has only access to
the measurement Z0 and the statistical model of the loads
L. Since these have a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
the optimal state estimate (minimum mean square error
(MMSE) estimate) is given by the conditional mean of Lj
[14, Example 3.4],
Lˆ0j := E[Lj |Z0] = mj +
Pj
P0 +R0
(Z0 −m0), (5)
where Pj = Pj1 + . . . + Pjj + . . . + PjN . The variance of
the estimation error is
Q0j := E[(Lˆ
0
j − Lj)2] = Pjj −
P 2j
P0 +R0
, (6)
and provides a baseline accuracy indicator for state estima-
tion. It is clear that if the variance of the load Lj (Pjj)
is small in comparison to the variance of the measurement
Z0, the operator gains very little information through this
measurement.
B. MAP State Estimation with Smart Meters
When the load model and the measurements all have a
jointly Gaussian distribution, the MMSE estimate and the
maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimate (see [15],
for example) coincide, and are equal to E[Lj|Z0]. In the
Smart Meter Scenario, the random noise W1,W2, . . . ,WN
follow a Laplacian distribution, and therefore this is no
longer the case, in general. It is well known [14, The-
orem 3.1] that the MMSE estimate is still given by the
conditional mean Lˆ⋆j := E[Lj|Z0, Z1, . . . , ZN ], but a simple
closed-form expression for Lˆ⋆j similar to (5) is in this case
not known to us. The MAP estimate also does not have a
simple closed-form solution, but it is possible to compute it
online by means of a simple convex program, as we show
next.
The PDF for the load vector L takes the form
pL(l) =
(2π)−N/2√
detP
e−‖P
−1/2(l−m)‖2
2
/2,
and the conditional PDF for the measurements are
pZ0,Z|L(z0, z|l) =
1√
2πσ0(2b)N
e−(z0−l0)
2/(2σ2
0
)e−‖z−l‖1/b,
where Z := (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN )T and l0 := 1T l. Given the
received measurements z0 and z, the MAP estimate of Lj
can be obtained as
LˆMAP(z0, z) := argmax
l
pZ¯|L(z0, z|l)pL(l). (7)
The following proposition states an alternative, and more
explicit form of the estimate.
Proposition 2: The MAP estimate of L given the mea-
surements z0, z is
LˆMAP(z0, z) = argmin
l
(z0 − 1T l)2
2σ20
+
1
2
‖P−1/2(l −m)‖22 +
1
b
‖z − l‖1.
Proof: Follows by a straightforward insertion of the
PDFs into (7).
The optimization problem in Proposition 2 is convex since
the objective is a sum of 1-norm and 2-norm expressions.
Hence, it can easily be solved using standard optimization
software. Although this result is useful for an implementation
of the state estimator, we are not aware of an accuracy
indicator similar to Q0j . Because of this, we next turn to
an optimal linear estimator, where we can characterize the
accuracy in general.
Remark 5: Recently [16] investigated dynamical state es-
timation problems where the noise was a mix of Gaussian
and Laplacian random variables. Although the motivation for
that work was not related to privacy, it seems the results
obtained there have implications for privacy as well.
C. LMMSE State Estimation with Smart Meters
For arbitrarily distributed measurements, it turns out that if
we limit ourselves to only linear estimators when minimizing
the mean square error (the LMMSE), we obtain simple
closed-form expressions. We will use the following result.
Proposition 3 (Theorem 2.1 [14]): Let the random vari-
able (X,Z) have mean (mx,mz) and covariance
[Σxx Σxz
Σyz Σzz
]
.
Then the LMMSE estimate is given by
E
lin[X |Z] := mx +ΣxzΣ−1zz (Z −mz),
with estimation error covariance Σxx − ΣxzΣ−1zz Σzx.
In the Smart Meter Scenario, using Proposition 3 one
easily obtains the LMMSE estimate of Lj given all the
measurements as
Lˆ0:Nj := E
lin[Lj |Z0, Z]
= mj +
[
Pj
P:j
]T [
P0 +R0 1
TP
P1 P + R
]−1 [
Z0 −m0
Z −m
]
,
where P:j is the j-th column of the covariance matrix P .
The accuracy of the LMMSE estimate is
Q0:Nj := E[(Lj − Lˆ0:Nj )2]
= Pjj −
[
Pj
P:j
]T [
P0 +R0 1
TP
P1 P + R
]−1 [
Pj
P:j
]
.
(8)
It should be clear that the accuracy is not as good as the
MMSE estimate Lˆ⋆j , in general, since we have only optimized
over the linear estimators.
To get an even simpler closed-form expression, an
LMMSE estimate based on only a few of the measurements
is constructed.
Proposition 4: The LMMSE estimate of Lj given the
measurements Z0, Zj is
Lˆ0,jj := E
lin[Lj |Z0, Zj ]
= Lˆ0j +Kj
[
(Zj −mj)− Pj
R0 + P0
(Z0 −m0)
]
,
where Lˆ0j is the Base Scenario MMSE estimate (5), and
Kj =
(R0 + P0)Pjj − P 2j
(R0 + P0)(Pjj +Rj)− P 2j
∈ [0, 1]. (9)
The accuracy of Lˆ0,jj is
Q0,jj := E[(Lj − Lˆ0,jj )2] = Q0j(1 −Kj) ≤ Q0j , (10)
where Q0j is the accuracy of the Base Scenario MMSE esti-
mate (6).
Proof: Applying the Schur complement formula to the
inverse covariance matrix in the LMMSE estimate
Lˆ0,jj := E
lin[Lj |Z0, Zj]
= mj +
[
Pj
Pjj
]T [
P0 +R0 Pj
Pj Pjj +Rj
]−1 [
Z0 −m0
Zj −mj
]
,
yields the desired expression. After some manipulations
of (8) applied to only the measurements Z0 and Zj , the
expression in (10) is obtained.
It is seen from Proposition 4 that the variable Kj can both
be seen as the gain one should use to fuse in the additional
measurement Zj to the estimate of Lj , and as a measure of
the relative improvement in the estimate as compared to the
Base Scenario, i.e., Kj =
Q0j−Q0,jj
Q0j
.
The relation between the accuracies of the different esti-
mators is summarized next.
Corollary 1: For j = 1, 2, . . . , N , it holds that
Q⋆j ≤ Q0:Nj ≤ Q0,jj ≤ Q0j ,
where Q⋆j := E[(Lj − Lˆ⋆j )2] and Lˆ⋆j is the MMSE estimate
given measurements Z0, Z .
The reason we are interested in Lˆ0,jj and Q
0,j
j is because
they are easily computed and provide a simple non-trivial
expression for the improvement given by a single load
measurement Zj . The point is that if a more complicated
estimate is constructed, such as Lˆ⋆j or Lˆ0:Nj , their accuracy
will be at least as good as indicated by Kj in (10). This will
prove useful in the next section where some insights related
to the trade-off between privacy and estimation quality are
obtained.
V. TRADE-OFF: ESTIMATION PERFORMANCE VS.
PRIVACY LOSS
A customer in the Smart Meter Scenario has (ǫ+ǫ0, δ0eǫ)-
differential privacy, following Theorem 1. The customer can
increase his or her privacy by increasing the smart meter
noise level Rj , but this comes at the expense of the state
estimation performance. In this section, we investigate this
trade-off a bit closer, and in particular identify situations
where only a minor loss of privacy can lead to a large
improvement in the state estimate.
We start by introducing the dimensionless quantities
ηj :=
∆2
Pjj
, ζj :=
Pjj
P0 +R0
.
The variable ηj normalizes the customer’s variability with
the total load variability at location j. Hence, it is a measure
of how large player the customer is in comparison with
other loads at location j. The variable ζj measures how
large the total load variability at location j is in comparison
with the overall current variability in the distribution line.
Thus if both ηj and ζj are small, it means the customer is a
relatively small player at location j, and location j is overall
responsible for only a small part of the variability on the
line.
In the following, we for simplicity assume that the loads
are uncorrelated, i.e., that Pj = Pjj . We use that the variance
of the Laplacian measurement noise added to Lj is
Rj =
2∆2
ǫ2
=
2ηjPjj
ǫ2
.
We can now express the relative improvement of the state
estimate as (see (9)–(10))
Kj =
(R0 + P0)Pjj − P 2j
(R0 + P0)(Pjj +Rj)− P 2j
=
1
1 +
Rj(R0+P0)
(R0+P0)Pjj−P 2jj
=
1
1 +
2ηj
ǫ2(1−ζj)
≈ ǫ
2(1− ζj)
2ηj
,
(11)
where the last approximation holds for small ǫ. The total
differential privacy for the customer is (ǫ+ǫ0, δ0eǫ) and ǫ is a
measure of how much extra privacy the customer at location
j gives up by sharing his or her load measurement. The
customer’s differential privacy can be no better than (ǫ0, δ0),
and using Lemma 1 this lower bound is
ǫ20 ≈
∆2K2
R0
= ηjζjK
2
(
1 +
P0
R0
)
. (12)
Not surprisingly, small ηj and ζj assure a high level of
privacy to the customer in the Base Scenario because his
or her actions are barely noticeable in Z0.
In Figs. 2 and 3, we plot the lower bound on relative
improvement (11) as a function of the total loss of privacy,
for fixed ζj and ηj , respectively. The values of ηj and ζj are
chosen to give comparable values for the lower bounds ǫ0
(indicated by circles in Figs. 2 and 3). It is interesting to see
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Fig. 2. Lower b nd on the relative improvement of the state estimate
in the Smart Meter Scenario (Kj), as a function of total loss of customer
privacy, when P0 = 1, R0 = 0.05, δ0 = 0.05, ζj = 0.1, and varying
customer variability ηj . It is seen that the curvature dramatically increases
for customers who have a high level of privacy in the Base Scenario (small
ǫ0).
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Fig. 3. Lower b nd on the relative improvement of the state estimate
in the Smart Meter Scenario (Kj), as a function of total loss of customer
privacy, when P0 = 1, R0 = 0.05, δ0 = 0.05, ηj = 0.01, and varying
load variability ζj . It is seen that the curvature increases for customers who
have a higher level of privacy in the Base Scenario (small ǫ0).
that the improvement curves increase faster for small values
of ǫ0, especially as the customer’s variability ηj decreases.
This is also clearly seen in the quadratic approximation (11),
whose curvature is (1−ζj)/(2ηj). Combining (11) and (12),
Kj ≈ ǫ
2
2ηj
(1− ζj) ≈ K
2
2
(
1 +
P0
R0
)
ζj(1− ζj)
(
ǫ
ǫ0
)2
(13)
we also directly see that a small ǫ0 increases the curvature.
(The quadratic approximations are indicated by dashed lines
in Figs. 2 and 3.) The importance of this observation is that
a customer who enjoys a high level of differential privacy
in the Base Scenario can dramatically improve the state
estimation performance by only giving up a little bit extra of
privacy. For example, in Fig. 2, we see that if a customer is
willing to increase ǫ0+ ǫ from 0.25 to 0.35 when ηj = 0.01,
there is at least around 30% improvement in estimation
quality. On the other hand, the smart meter measurements
of a customer who already has a low level of privacy in
the Base Scenario are of much lower value. The reason is
that such customers are already possible to estimate quite
accurately using the measurement Z0 alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a modeling framework to analyze the
differential privacy for customers equipped with smart meters
in a radial distribution power grid. Several different state
estimation schemes were proposed, and an interesting trade-
off between the utility for the operator and the loss of
privacy for the customer was identified. The analysis revealed
that aggregated measurements from small customers can
significantly improve the operator’s state estimate at a small
loss of privacy.
It should be noted that in the current framework it is
not possible for the customer to influence the baseline
(ǫ0, δ0)-differential privacy. This would be possible if the
customer has access to a local controllable energy storage,
see [17], for example. Open problems for future research
also include more detailed modeling of the distribution grid
and quantification of the accuracy of the MAP estimate.
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